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Yue Ma* 
and 
Huayu Sun+ 
 
Abstract 
We build a monetary model to show how expected revaluations lead to the 
instability of a pegged exchange rate regime. This model assumes current 
account convertibility and some degree of capital control, and 
fundamentally sound domestic policies and economy, as is the case in 
China. The model demonstrates that market-oriented interest rates can act 
as an automatic stabilizer to ease revaluation pressures, but cannot resolve 
them completely because the nominal interest rate has a zero nominal 
bound. Therefore, the official parity will eventually collapse and the 
revaluation expectations can be self-fulfilling, in the absence of external 
intervention. The empirical results of Granger causality tests are consistent 
with the main findings of our theoretical model. There are a number of 
alternative policy intervention measures that can extend the life of pegged 
exchange rate regime. 
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1. Introduction  
There are two well-known benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime. 
First, a fixed exchange rate transfers the exchange rate risk from the 
private sector to the government and hence reduces the market uncertainty 
and transaction costs. Thus, a fixed exchange rate can encourage 
international trade and investment, and therefore promote economic 
growth. The second benefit is the anchor effect of the fixed exchange rate 
that can help stabilize the domestic price level. A great deal of empirical 
evidence supports these conclusions (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004).  
Many developing countries officially choose a fixed exchange rate 
regime. In addition many other emerging economies have adopted de facto 
fixed exchange rate regimes, although officially they are floating ones 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). For example, 
according to the Regulations on Foreign Exchange of China, which was 
implemented in 1996 and revised in 1997, China officially has a managed 
floating exchange rate regime. However, since 1998 China has effectively 
adopted a fixed exchange rate regime that pegged Chinese currency 
renminbi in a tight range against the US dollar at a rate of 8.28. 
However, according to Fischer (2001), only a currency board and 
dollarization are sustainable (hard-pegged) fixed exchange rate regimes. 
All other soft-pegged exchange rate regimes will eventually be given up, 
be converted into hard-pegged, or switched to free floating ones. This 
polarization of the exchange rate regimes implies that the intermediate 
arrangements of the exchange rate regimes are intrinsically unstable. 
Although the three generation models in the literature illustrate various 
causes of devaluations of the currencies (Eichengreen, Ross and Wyplosz, 
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1995; Ma and Kanas, 2000; Tsang and Ma, 2002), they did not analyze the 
pressure for revaluation.   
After China joined the WTO in 2001, expectations for renminbi 
revaluation have been increasing rapidly due to China’s persistent trade 
surplus and large amount of foreign capital inflows (Ma, 2001). In 2002, 
the item of errors and omissions in China’s balance of payments swung to 
US$7.8 billion from –US$4.9 billion in 2001 (State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange of China, 2001, 2002), which indicates to some extent 
the size of capital inflows brought by speculators to bet on a sharp 
appreciation of the renminbi. Although the item of errors and omissions 
was about US$4.7 billion in the first-half of 2003 (State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange of China, 2003), a report suggested that US$20 to 25 
billion of “hot money” sneaked into mainland China (Zhao, 2004). Another 
estimate suggested that there might be US$ 50 billion of “hot money” 
entered China through various channels (Kynge，2004). These higher 
estimates are approximately equal to the amount of foreign direct 
investment in China over the same period. 
After several years of resistance, China eventually made a modest 
2.1% revaluation of RMB in July 2005, and switched to a flexible 
exchange rate system based on the reference value of a basket of currencies 
(People's Bank of China, 2005). So far, the RMB apparently still links to 
the US dollar implicitly, albeit under a widened trading band. This may 
continuously invite speculative capital inflows. A large scale inflow of 
“hot money” will threaten the stability of the money supply in China. If the 
monetary authority can not dissolve the revaluation pressure, the renminbi 
will have to be revalued again in the near future. Thus, revaluation 
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expectations would be self-fulfilling, similar to the outcome of devaluation 
expectations (Obstfeld, 1996).  
This paper extends the theoretical monetary model with sticky-price 
under continuous-time developed by Sun and Ma (2005) to show that 
persistent appreciation pressure will cause excess accumulation of 
international reserves. The main findings of this paper are that 
market-oriented interest rates can act as an automatic stabilizer to ease the 
appreciation pressures, but cannot resolve them to ensure a stable pegged 
exchange rate regime. If there is not any external intervention from the 
government, the pegged parity will finally collapse under appreciation 
pressures. Our model highlights some optional intervention measures and 
suggestions for system reform in China. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: A sticky-price 
continuous-time monetary model under the pegged exchange rate regime is 
built in Section 2, showing how an external expectation shock gives rise to 
appreciation pressure. In Section 3, the model is adapted to explain the 
automatic stabilization effect of the market-oriented interest rate in 
relieving appreciation pressures and its limit as an automatic stabilizer. In 
Section 4, we employ Granger causality tests to examine the main findings 
of our theoretical model. Policy options are discussed in Section 5, based 
on an analysis of changes in major parameters of the model that trigger or 
postpone currency crisis. A summary is provided in Section 6. 
 
2. Emergence of appreciation pressures   
Our sticky-price continuous-time monetary model begins with a 
conventional money demand function: 
M d(t) / P(t) = k Y - h r(t)    (1) 
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Where Md(t) is the domestic nominal money demand at time t, P(t) 
represents a price index and, according to the sticky-price hypothesis, it is 
assumed P(t)≡1; Y is the real GDP; r(t) is the nominal interest rate at time t, 
k and h are fixed parameters representing the sensitivity of money demand 
to national income and the interest rate respectively. 
Then, the money supply function is: 
M s(t) = m[D + R(t)]   (2) 
Where M s (t) is the nominal money supply at time t, D represents 
domestic credit of the central bank that is taken as a constant; this implies 
the central bank executes its monetary policies independent of fiscal 
policy1. R(t) represents the official foreign exchange reserve denominated 
in domestic currency, and m represents the monetary creation multiplier. 
Assuming that the domestic monetary market maintains instantaneous 
equilibrium, namely   M d(t) = M s(t) , then 
r(t)=[k Y - mD - mR(t) ] / h (3) 
In the domestic goods market, GDP is determined by autonomous 
expenditures A and interest rate:  
Y = A – b r(t)   (4) 
where b is a fixed parameter representing the sensitivity of national income 
to the interest rate. 
Substituting (4) into (3), we get the equilibrium interest rate, 
r(t)=[kA - mD - mR(t) ] /(kb+ h)  (5) 
Define the “desired” demand for net domestic assets as: 
K*(t) = s[r(t) - r* - Ė(t) - λ] (6) 
                                                        
1 In the first-generation model of currency crisis (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984), it 
assumes that domestic credit increases with the rise of fiscal deficits; currency crisis is 
triggered by improper domestic policies. The model in this paper is different from the first 
generation model in this point. 
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where K*(t) represents the net stock of domestic assets that investors desire 
to hold at time t. The nominal foreign interest rate, r*, is assumed to be a 
constant to simplify the analysis. The term Ė(t) represents the expected 
appreciation rate. When there is a common expectation that the domestic 
currency will be revalued, we have Ė(t)<0. Then r-r*- Ė(t) represents the 
excess rate of return on domestic assets over foreign assets. We assume 
that Ė(t)= -ϕ t, where ϕ is a constant and is defined as the appreciation 
expectations shock to capital account. The term λ is a positive risk 
premium parameter measuring the degree of asset substitutability 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000; Meredith and Ma, 2002; Ma, Meredith and 
Yiu, 2002). If λ =0, then domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes, 
and the choice of assets from different countries and the amount held will 
only depend on the excess rate of return on domestic assets over foreign 
assets. If λ>0 ,then investors consider that the risk on domestic assets will 
be higher than that on foreign assets and if the rate of return on domestic 
assets equals to that on foreign assets, investors prefer to hold foreign 
assets. The substitution of assets is mainly determined by the 
macroeconomic environment, especially by international differences in 
financial systems, which may be affected by policies in the short run and 
also may be changed with the evolution of financial markets in the long 
run. Since China is a developing country with a large amount of 
nonperforming loans, this paper considers the circumstance of λ>0. Finally, 
s is a positive parameter which measures the sensitivity of asset demand to 
the excess rate of return. 
Therefore (6) can be rewritten as: 
K*(t) = s[r(t) - r* + ϕ t - λ] (7) 
Let k(t) represent the actual net stock of domestic assets, and it may 
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not equal K*(t) until investment portfolios have been adjusted to the 
desired levels. Actual net foreign capital inflow at time t is assumed to be a 
partial adjustment process,  
dK(t)/dt = θ [K*(t) - K(t)] 
= θ s [r(t) - r* ] + θ s ϕ t - θ sλ - θ K(t)    0≤θ ≤+∞ (8) 
where θ is the capital adjustment coefficient reflecting the degree of capital 
mobility. Theoretically, international capital mobility reflects the possibility, 
cost and time lag for adjustment of existing portfolios towards desired 
levels; while in practice, the degree of capital mobility is not only 
restrained by international settlement facilities, but also by rules of capital 
control, which can be totally changed overnight. With the extreme 
convenience of transactions provided by the international capital market, θ 
is mainly dependent on how the authorities operate capital control. If θ= 
+∞, it means there is free, unrestricted capital flow, and investors can 
adjust their portfolios to desired levels instantaneously and capital mobility 
is perfect. If θ = 0, capital movement is under full control and cannot move 
at the will of investors. If 0<θ<+∞, capital is under partial control, 
incomplete mobility exists, and at each moment, adjustment of capital 
stock can only make up part of the gap between K(t) and K*(t). According 
to current regulations and policies, mobility of international capitals is 
under partial control in China (Guo, 2003). So this paper assumes 
0<θ<+∞.   
To simplify the analysis, this paper also assumes that when t = 0, the 
net capital stock is zero, the monetary market is in equilibrium, and the 
domestic interest rate is identical to the foreign one: 
K(0)=0 ,  r(0) =[ k A - m D -m R(0) ] /(kb+ h) ,  r(0) = r*  (9) 
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The balance of international payments equals the rate of change of 
official foreign exchange reserve dR(t)/dt. It is the sum of the net capital 
inflow, dK(t)/dt, and the balance on current account CA: 
dR(t)/dt = dK(t)/dt + CA (10) 
In a standard analysis, the domestic and foreign national incomes, real 
exchange rate, marginal propensity to import and taste are independent 
variables in the function of CA.  Although it is assumed that domestic 
income shall grow with the decrease of interest rate and imports will 
increase, exports may grow with the increase of the supply capacity, and 
the real exchange rate will be fixed under the pegged regime and 
sticky-price assumption. For simplicity, the CA is assumed to be constant. 
Thus, the Current Account is an autonomous variable for economic agents, 
which is fully reflected in international payment statement under current 
account convertibility (Sun, 2003). 
Integrating both sides of (10) with respect to t, we obtain the foreign 
exchange reserve held by central bank up to t: 
R(t) = R(0) + K(t) + CA t (11) 
Where R(0) is the initial level of foreign exchange reserve. 
Based on (8) and (5), we obtain 
)(*)()( tKtsr
hkb
tmRmDkAs
dt
tdK θϕθθ −+

 −+
−−=  - θsλ  (12) 
Substituting (11) and (9) into (12): 
)(*)()0()( tKtsr
hkb
mCAttmKmRmDkAs
dt
tdK θϕθθ −+

 −+
−−−−=  - θs λ 
)()( tKts
hkb
mCAttmKs θϕθθ −+


+
−−=  - θs λ (13) 
Rearranging (13), we have  
dK(t)/dt + α K(t) = -β t - θs λ (14) 
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where 
α = θ sm/(kb+ h) +θ = θ (δ+1) > 0， 
β = θ [s mCA/(kb+ h) - s ϕ] = θ(δCA- s ϕ), (14a) 
δ = s m/(kb+ h) > 0. 
 
The solution of (14) is  
α
β
α
βα tetK t −−= − 2)1()(  - θ sλ )1( te α−− /α  (15) 
Differentiating both sides of (15) with respect to t, we obtain 
α
βα )1()( te
dt
tdK −−−=  - θ sλ te α−  (16) 
Substituting (16) into (10), and we find that the balance of 
international payment is dependent on the current account balance CA, 
appreciation expectations shock ϕ, degree of capital mobility θ and other 
parameters: 
=+= CA
dt
tdK
dt
tdR )()(  α
βα )1( te−−− - θ sλ te α− + CA 
 = δ
δ α
+
+ −
1
1 te
CA + sϕ δ
α
+
− −
1
1 te  - θ sλ te α−  (17) 
Denote the balance of international payments as: ∆(t)≡
dt
tdR )( .  
Given the revaluation expectations shock to the capital account (ϕ >0) 
and surplus on current account (CA >0), we have ∆(t) >0 if the risk 
premium λ=0. By continuity, there exists a positive number λ1>0, such 
that for a small risk premium λ∈[0, λ1], we have  
∆(t) >0. (17a) 
A positive balance of payments implies a continuous accumulation of 
international reserves. The consequence is that the expectation of 
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appreciation may be self-fulfilled.  
However, the risk premium λ in a developing country could be quite 
high. That would offset the capital inflow induced by the excess rate of 
return on domestic assets and would release some of the appreciation 
pressure. China as a developing country has an immature financial market 
and a large amount of nonperforming loans in the banking sector. Hence 
China might have a significant high risk premium λ on her domestic assets. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese government provides implicit insurance for its 
financial system that effectively has reduced the risk premium. As a result, 
the risk premium cannot offset the hot money inflow attracted by the 
revaluation expectations on the Chinese currency renminbi. The estimated 
large amount of hot money inflow (see Section 1) indeed indicated that 
speculators did not perceive the Chinese assets were highly risky. 
Therefore, in the remaining part of the paper, we will focus on the case that 
there is a revaluation pressure, i.e., we assume ∆(t) >0 for the remaining 
part of the paper.   
 
3. The market-oriented interest rate as an automatic stabilizer to the 
pegged exchange rate regime and its limitations 
Flexible adjustment of market interest rates may affect both the 
domestic money market and the international payment in a interconnected 
way: Equation (1) indicates that domestic money demand is a decreasing 
function of the interest rate, and equation (3) shows that the equilibrium 
interest rate in the domestic money market and international reserves are 
negatively correlated with each other. In the case of a positive shock to 
international payments, an increase in international reserves will result in 
an increase in the domestic money supply. An excess money supply causes 
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market interest rates to fall which stimulates the domestic demand for 
money, and when the increased domestic money demand equals the 
increase in money supply, the equilibrium in the domestic money market is 
restored. This process shows partially the mechanism of market-oriented 
interest rate in the domestic monetary market (Sun, 2000), but it is not the 
whole picture of the function of market-oriented interest rate. With respect 
to international payments, we can see from equation (8) that the net capital 
inflow is an increasing function of domestic interest rates. When a positive 
shock to international payments occurs, a fall in domestic interest rates 
reduces the capital inflow and may give rise to capital outflow, which 
reduce excess accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and ease 
appreciation pressures. Inasmuch as δ
δ α
+
+ −
1
1 te <1， δ
α
+
− −
1
1 te <1, equation (17) 
shows that the overall balance of international payment surplus shall be 
smaller than the sum of current account surplus and revaluation 
expectations shock to the capital account. Therefore, market-oriented 
interest rates can facilitate the stability of the exchange rate parity, which 
acts as the automatic stabilizer to a pegged exchange rate regime. 
Furthermore, as shown in equation (8) the influence of the automatic 
stabilizer is dependent on θ. When θ is large, which means a high level of 
openness of the capital account, a large amount of capital outflow will be 
occurred by a small decrease in interest rate. That will ease significantly 
the revaluation pressure from the excess accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves. 
However, we can see from equation (17) that the interest rate 
adjusting mechanism has its limit. In the case of a shock of revaluation 
expectations and a persistent current account surplus, namely ϕ>0 and CA 
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>0, respectively, domestic interest rates can fall, yet the capital outflow 
resulting from this is not sufficient to offset the capital inflow caused by 
the shocks; the interest rate adjusting mechanism cannot reverse the trend 
of escalating foreign exchange reserves. That is, when the balance of 
payment ∆(t) >0, the domestic money supply continues to increase, and 
nominal domestic interest rates drop persistently according to equation (3). 
When the nominal interest rate reaches zero, it cannot fall any further. 
Then the pegged exchange rate collapses. 
Assume at t = tA, r(tA) = 0, i.e., the nominal interest rate can not be 
lowered any more and foreign exchange reserves rise to the maximum 
level according to equation (5): 
R(tA) = A k/ m - D  (18) 
Although the mechanism of market-oriented interest rate can act as 
the automatic stabilizer for a pegged exchange rate regime, the effect is 
limited and is not strong enough to maintain the pegged parity. 
It is indicated from the above analysis that the mechanism of 
market-oriented interest rate can ease some of the revaluation pressure 
induced from the excess accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, yet 
the market mechanism with its automatic adjustment can not fully resolve 
the effects from the shock, notwithstanding prudent domestic monetary 
policies. To resolve the appreciation pressures and maintain a pegged parity, 
additional prevention measures may have to be applied. 
To illustrate the solution of our model, we depict the four time paths 
of hot money, official foreign reserves, money supply, and nominal interest 
rate in Figs 1 to 4, respectively. Fig 1 shows the increase of hot money 
over time and Fig 2 gives the picture of rising official foreign reserves due 
to foreign exchange market (non-sterilized) interventions by the central 
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bank in dealing with hot money inflow. The impact of growing reserves on 
money supply is illustrated in Fig 3. Finally, Fig 4 presents the falling 
nominal interest rate to maintain the money market equilibrium and the 
time of collapse of the pegged exchange rate regime when the interest rate 
hits the zero floor. 
0 time 
 
0 time 
 
0 time 
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0 time 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
To test the main conclusions of our theoretical model, we examine the 
Granger causalities (a) from foreign reserves to M2 and (b) from M2 to 
interest rate. We utilized monthly data over the sample period of January 
2001 to July 2002. 
We chose this sample period based on the following observations. 
Before year 2000, Asian emerging economies were experiencing 
devaluations due to the lagged effects of Asian financial crisis. Exports of 
China also suffered significant negative impacts. The slowdown in 
economic growth in China presented a devaluation pressure to renminbi. 
Since year 2000, the devaluation pressure on renminbi has gradually been 
released due to the increasing exports of China. The international pressure 
on renminbi revaluation started after 2001.  
There are two early articles to suggest renminbi revaluation. One is 
“China’s cheap money” published in Financial Times (2001). The other is 
“Expectations of renminbi revaluation – an advancement of the theory of 
Chinese threat” published in Japanese Economic News (2001) (see Tan 
and He, 2003). Some Chinese scholars also recommended a “moderate 
revaluation” of renminbi (see, for example, Zhang, 2003). On the other 
hand, there are scholars argued that a stable renminbi is beneficial for both 
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China and world economies (see, for example, McKinnon and Schnab, 
2003) 
Since 2001, Chinese foreign reserves has been increasing dramatically 
due to the surpluses on both capital account and current account as well as 
repeated, non-sterilized, interventions by the People’s Bank of China on 
the foreign exchange market. That had increased the money supply (cf. Fig 
5). The consequence was the continuous decline of interbank interest rates 
(cf. Fig 6). 
Fig 5. Log of Foreign Exchange Reserves (LNFER), M2 (LNM2) and 
CPI (LNCPI) 
(Jan. 2001 to July 2002) 
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Source: People's Bank of China, China Monthly Economic Indicators. 
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Fig 6. Seven-day Interbank Interest Rate 
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Source: China Statistical Information & Service Centre. 
 
Our theoretical model explained quite well of this whole development. 
However, the People’s bank of China started to buy in treasury bills in the 
open market to sterilize the increase of money supply resulted from the rise 
of foreign reserves. This led to the rebound of interbank interest rate. For 
simplicity, we did not consider the issue of sterilization in our theoretical 
model; hence, we did not consider this issue in our empirical work also. 
The monthly data source of foreign reserves (FER) and M2 is 
People’s bank of China. CPI is obtained from “China’s Economic Prospect 
Monthly”. Nominal value-added of industry (VAI) and the interbank 
interest rate (IIR07) are from China Economic Information Centre. Since 
China did not publish monthly GDP series, we approximate it by the 
value-added of industry series.  
According to the Phillips-Perron unit root tests, we found all time 
series are I(1) (cf. Table 1). 
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Table 1. Unit Root Test 
Phillips-Perron test statistic 
Variable name
H0: I(1)(level) H0: I(2)( 1st difference) 
Conclusion 
lnFER 0.228190 -3.080867* I(1) 
lnM2 -2.478580 -4.981554* I(1) 
IIR07 0.973261 -3.128625* I(1) 
lnVAI -3.476153 -4.173924* I(1) 
lnCPI -1.882243 -4.360283* I(1) 
Notes: * significant at the 5% level for rejection of null hypothesis of a unit 
root. Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 2. All variables are in logs except 
7-day interbank interest rate IIR07. Sample period: Jan. 2001 to July 2002. 
 
From the Johansen cointegration test, we found foreign reserves
（lnFER）and M2（lnM2）have one cointegration relationship. The 
cointegration equation for the sample period of Jan. 2001 to July 2002 is： 
lnM2 = 0.51 lnFER + 3.33 Constant + cointegration error term 
 
This indicates that money supply equation (2) holds. According to the 
vector error-correction estimation, foreign reserves do Granger cause to 
M2. Although foreign reserves is not significant in the short run in the M2 
equation, the error correction term is significant, which indicates that when 
the foreign reserves and M2 deviate from their long run relation, there is an 
automatic adjustment mechanism to restore the long run equilibrium (cf. 
Table 2). 
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Table 2. Error-correction Equation of lnM2 (Jan. 2001 to July 2002) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard errors t-statistics 
Cointegration error term(-1) -0.679063 0.24727 -2.74623* 
D(lnM2(-1)) 0.129019 0.24998 0.51611 
D(lnM2(-2)) -0.422221 0.24721 -1.70792 
D(lnFER(-1)) 0.019002 0.22569 0.08419 
D(lnFER(-2)) -0.404683 0.24010 -1.68548 
Constant 0.022203 0.00673 3.29944* 
Adj. R-squared  0.358180 S.E. of regression  0.005923 
Note: * significant at the 5% level. 
 
From the Johansen cointegration test, we found 7-day interbank 
interest rate (IIR07), lnM2 and lnCPI also have one cointegration 
relationship. The cointegration equation for the sample period of Jan. 2001 
to July 2002 is： 
IIR07 = -6.30 lnM2 + 13.30 lnCPI + cointegration error term 
 
According to the error-correction estimation, lnM2 does Granger 
cause to interest rate. In the short run, lnM2, lnCPI and output (lnVAI) do 
not affect interest rate significantly. However, in the long run, the 
error-correction mechanism will adjust the interest rate to the equilibrium 
relationship (cf. Table 3).  
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Table 3. Error-correction equation of interest rate IIR07 (Jan. 2001 to July 2002) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard  Error t-Statistic 
Cointegration error term(-1) -0.031165 0.012643 -2.465040* 
D(lnM2(-1)) 1.819183 1.487152 1.223267 
D(lnCPI(-1)) -1.054388 1.576450 -0.668837 
D(lnVAI(-1)) -0.090045 0.092041 -0.978310 
D(IIR07(-1)) -0.034723 0.292120 -0.118864 
Adjusted R-squared 0.243471 S.E. of regression 0.032885 
Note: * significant at the 5% level. 
 
This conclusion is consistent with our recent findings that M2 did not 
Granger cause CPI during the period of January 2000 to June 2002 (Sun 
and Ma, 2004).From the cointegration equation of interest rate, lnM2 and 
lnCPI, we also found that the long-run elasticity of CPI with respect to M2 
is 0.48, which is less than unity. According to the error-correction 
estimation of lnCPI, lnM2 does not Granger cause to lnCPI. In the short 
run, lnM2, IIR07 and output (lnVAI) do not affect lnCPI significantly.  In 
the long run, the error correction mechanism will not adjust the interest 
rate to the equilibrium relationship (to save space, we did not present the 
details of the test results, which are available on request). This implies that 
the price index of China is not sensitive to the money supply within our 
sample period. All these arguments give support for the sticky-price 
assumption in our theoretical model.  
 
5. Alternative strategy for government 
By combining equation (15) and (11), and we can see that 
international reserves are determined by the initial level of foreign 
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exchange reserve, the expected appreciations, the external shock to the 
current account: 
R(t) = R(0) - 22 α
β
α
β
α
βα +−

− te t  + CA t - θ sλ )1( te α−− /α (19) 
Then insert (18) into (19), we obtain 
R(0) - )(22 CAe A
t −−+

−
α
β
α
β
α
βα tA - θ sλ )1( Ate α−− /α   = A k/ m - D(20) 
This indicates that the life of a pegged exchange rate tA is a implicit 
function of revaluation expectation shock (ϕ), the risk premium of 
domestic assets λ, the mobility of international capital θ, and autonomous 
expenditure A. Based on this function, partial derivatives of tA with respect 
to the above variables can be determined, and through analyzing the effects 
of these derivatives, suggestions for constructive strategy can then be put 
forward. 
(1) Expected revaluation shock (ϕ)  
Based on equation (20), we have 
)(
)]1(1[
A
t
A
A
t
ets
d
dt
A
∆
−−−
=
−α
αα
θ
ϕ  (21) 
By defining the function in the brackets of the numerator as f(t) 
?)1(1 tet αα
−−−= , we have f(0) = 0, when t>0, we have ?)1(1 tA et αα
−−− namely, 
f(t) is a positive monotonic increasing function, therefore )1(1 tA et αα
−−− >0. 
When the balance of international payment continues to be positive, 
∆(tA)>0 [cf. (17a)], we have 0<ϕd
dt A , and this indicates that if the size of the 
appreciation shock (ϕ) to the capital account is reduced, then the pegged 
exchange rate regime can be stabilized. In terms of China’s current 
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situation, consideration can be given to the repeated government 
declaration that there will be no revaluation.  The government has also 
sought to reduce speculative pressures through discussion of the Qualified 
Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) system, so as to boost the outflow 
of capital and offset a greater amount of capital inflow. 
 
(2)  Risk premium λ 
Based on equations (20), we have 
)(
/)1(
A
t
A
t
es
d
dt A
∆
−=
− αθ
λ
α
>0  (22) 
 
This means that if the risk premium λ goes up, the lifetime tA of the pegged 
rate will be extended. The risk premium will act as a natural barrier to keep 
the speculative capital outside the door. But when there are high 
appreciation pressures already, government’s action to reduce the risk 
premium of domestic assets may induce more speculative capital inflow 
and shorten the life of the pegged exchange rate system.    
 
(3)  International mobility of capital (θ)   
Based on equation (20), we have 
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Define the function in the brackets of the numerator as g(t)= 
t
t
tee α
α
α
−
−
−−1 , we have g(0)=0, when t>0, we have dg(t)/dt= tet αα − >0, 
Namely, g(t) is a positive monotone increasing function, therefore 
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Nevertheless, the impact of capital mobility (θ) on life of pegged 
exchange rate tA depends on the relative sizes of the current account shock 
CA and the revaluation expectations shock ϕ.  
(a) The relative size of the revaluation expectations shock ϕ is large 
but the current account surplus shock CA is small. 
Assume that both CA=0 and the risk premium λ=0, we have β = -θ sϕ 
<0, and hence 
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θ  < 0. 
By continuity, there exist two positive numbers CA* >0 and λ*>0, 
such that for  
CA∈[0, CA*] and λ∈[0, λ*], then θd
dt A  < 0. 
This indicates that if the revaluation pressure is dominated by the 
revaluation expectations shock ϕ over the current account surplus shock 
CA, the resistance capacity of pegged exchange rate can be improved by 
enhancing the control over foreign exchange (i.e., reducing θ). 
(b) The relative size of the revaluation expectations shock ϕ is small 
but the current account surplus shock CA is large. 
Assume that ϕ=0 we have β = θ δ CA > 0, and hence θd
dt A >0. 
By continuity, there exist a positive numbers ϕ* >0, such that for ϕ 
∈[0, ϕ*] then 
θd
dt A  > 0. 
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This shows that if the revaluation pressure is dominated by the current 
account surplus shock CA over the revaluation expectations shock ϕ, then 
an increase of the control over capital movements (i.e., θ goes down) will 
nevertheless impede the outflow of capital, weaken the stability of the 
exchange rate parity provided by the interest rate adjustment, and therefore 
accelerate the collapse of pegged exchange rate regime. In this 
circumstance, the correct government action should be to relax the control 
of capital movements (i.e., θ goes up). 
From the analyses of (a) and (b) above, we found that when the 
revaluation pressures is stemming from sustained balance of payment 
surpluses, the authority must identify whether it is brought about by current 
account surpluses or by revaluation expectations induced capital inflows. 
This is because the foreign exchange control under different circumstances 
requires totally different policy actions. 
 
(4) Autonomous expenditure A  
Based on equation (20), we have 
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−=
−
α
βα >0 （24） 
Given a positive shock to balance of payments (i.e., ∆( tA )>0), an increase 
in the autonomous expenditure will be favourable to the duration of fixed 
exchange rate.The increase in autonomous expenditure raises the demand 
for money, which absorbs the increase of money supply as a result of the 
increase in foreign reserves. That decelerates the downslide of interest rate 
and releases the pressure of appreciation.  
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6. Summary 
The simple open macroeconomic model established in this paper 
reflects the economic features of a pegged exchange rate regime: full 
convertibility of the current account, partial convertibility of the capital 
account, market determined interest rate, sound domestic policies, sound 
economic fundamentals, and the existence of a revaluation expectation 
shock on international payments. This theoretical model simulates the 
appreciation pressures on the pegged exchange rate through pushing down 
the interest rate. Our empirical studies support the main results obtained 
from our theoretical model. We found that the market-oriented interest rate 
mechanism can alleviate, but not completely dissolve, such pressure. 
Therefore a currency crisis under appreciation pressure may develop. 
However, based on this model we can suggest some options for policy 
intervention, which may be utilized to make up for the deficiency of the 
automatic stabilizer effect of the interest rate mechanism and to help 
maintain the pegged exchange rate.  
For example, when the relative size of the revaluation expectations 
shock is small but the current account surplus shock is large, the authority 
may relax the control of capital movements. This would enhance the 
stability of the exchange rate parity provided by the interest rate 
adjustment, and therefore delay the collapse of pegged exchange rate 
regime. In contrast, if the revaluation pressure is dominated by capital 
inflow induced by the revaluation beliefs, then the authority has to tighten 
up the capital control to stabilize the pegged exchange rate.  
Another finding of this paper is that an increase in the domestic 
autonomous expenditure can enhance the role of the interest rate 
 26
mechanism, delay the excess accumulation of reserves, and help maintain 
the pegged exchange rate.  
In addition to the short-term policy recommendations, the authors 
believe that, in terms of financial system construction, the attitude towards 
the acceleration of market-oriented reform of interest rates should be 
supported. This is because the acceleration of the market-oriented reform 
of interest rates, while improving the allocation of domestic financial 
resources, will also help offset the negative impact of revaluation 
expectation shocks.  
Furthermore, the government should gradually remove the implicit 
insurance to the banking system and allow the market to assess the true 
risk of Chinese domestic assets which would stop some of the speculative 
capital inflows. 
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